W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1984

Soviet Nuclear Doctrine: Perspectives and Purposes
John David Wilson
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd
Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Wilson, John David, "Soviet Nuclear Doctrine: Perspectives and Purposes" (1984). Dissertations, Theses,
and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625267.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-6kk5-zz43

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE:
PERSPECTIVES AND PURPOSES

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Government
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
John Wilson
1984

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Author

Approvedr December 1984

iA a a /?

AlaiY^J. Ward
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ABSTRACT

This paper is a study of Soviet attitudes toward
nuclear war and nuclear weapons from 1956 to 1984, as
reflected in public speeches, books, and articles.
Secondarily, it is an examination of the various
opinions on Soviet doctrine found in the American literature.
While the Soviets maintain that there are no
disagreements on doctrine, this paper finds that there are
many discrepancies.
Foremost are the divergent views held by
the military and the Party leadership.
To illustrate these differences, the attitudes of the
military and the Party leadership are traced through the
years and then compared at several points.
It is suggested that the confusion which exists in
Soviet doctrine is a result of many ends being pursued
through the single means of doctrine.
This study also
indicates that inter-service rivalry and disagreement over
resource allocations partially determine the content of
Soviet doctrine.

SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE:
PERSPECTIVES AND PURPOSES

INTRODUCTION

The 1980's are a turning point in matters of nuclear
armament.

New generations of weapons are being developed and

deployed while arms control has failed to please anyone.

The

debate on what we should do goes on at all levels of society.
At the base of each suggestion lies some conception of the
Soviet Union and how the Soviets approach nuclear war.

The

greatly contrasting American opinions on Soviet doctrine
prompted me to see for myself what the Soviets have to say
about nuclear war.

Although the Soviets insist there is a sharp division
between doctrine and strategy I chose to include them as one
category.

They are very closely related and the distinctions

are not always clear.

Any strategy is necessarily based on

assumptions that are doctrinal, whether they are presented as
such or not.

According to the Soviet definitions there is only one
doctrine, and it sets forth the state's officially adopted
views on the nature and character of possible future wars, as
well as how the state will prepare to meet these threats.
Strategic theory forms part of military science, which is the
2
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system of knowledge about the nature and laws of war,
preparation for war, and the methods of waging it.

Doctrine

is supposedly defined by the party leadership, who consider
economics and politics as well as military science in their
formulations.
General Staff.

Military science is the perogative of the
While there should be no disagreement in

doctrine, it is allowed or even encouraged in military
science.

However, the direction of inquiry pursued in

military science is supposedly determined by doctrine.

If

this is so then there should be no disagreement between the
two.

Soviet doctrine can not be ordered in a neatly bound
volume but must be hunted down.
what "counts" and what does not.

There is disagreement on
My solution was to count

all statements which dealt with the topic.

I found that

while there are some divisions within each major grouping
that there are two "schools of thought," which I have labeled
military and political.

The military view of doctrine was

obtained from the works of active and retired Soviet
officers.

American authors such as Harriet F. Scott and

Richard Pipes consider this to be the full extent of Soviet
doctrine.

The political view of doctrine was obtained almost
exclusively from speeches by the First

(or General)

Secretary

to the Party Congress meetings between 1956 and 1981.

The

best justification of this as doctrine is the relevance of
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the material and the obvious importance of the persons
involved.

It is also worth noting again that Soviet

definitions stress the dominance of the political side of
doctrine.

"Nuclear doctrine" is my term and does not reflect
Soviet usage.

Similiarly, I use the word "doctrine" where I

should properly say "doctrine and strategy."

This is for

convenience only and wherever distinction between the two is
needed I have made it clear.

I begin with the roots of current Soviet military
concepts and trace the development of military thought on
nuclear war from 1953 to the present.

In chapter two

political positions on nuclear war and how they have changed
are presented.

Chapter three compares political and military

positions from the same time frames in an attempt to
illustrate the differences involved.

The possible

motivations behind different doctrinal positions are examined
in chapter four to illustrate that this is not simply a
military matter, but necessarily involves the complexities of
domestic and international politics.

In the concluding

remarks I briefly summarize the military and party leadership
views of doctrine, and express my own opinion on some of the
points raised in this paper.

CHAPTER I
SOVIET DOCTRINE: THE MILITARY VIEW

A. The Basics of Soviet Doctrine and Strategy

Although the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear
bomb in 1949, no theoretical discussion concerning the impact
of nuclear weapons on warfare happened during Stalin's
lifetime.

Only months after his death the first stirrings of

a reassessment occurred with an article in Military Thought
which implied that his permanently operating factors were not
basic.

These five factors—

stability of the rear, morale of

the army, quantity and quality of divisions, armaments of the
army, and organizing ability of command personnel—

were

elevated to near sacred status by Stalin, and as a result new
military ideas were not discussed.

By 1956 most military theoreticians had rejected
Stalin's views, and his five factors were reduced to common
sense principles rather than holy commandments.

That same

year Khrushchev announced there was no longer any fatal
inevitability of war.*

The establishment of the

non-inevitability of war between opposing social systems
marks the beginning of the revolution in military affairs.
This major change away from Stalinist precepts on war was
5
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well established by the 21st Party Congress in 1961.

However, turning away from Stalin did not include
turning away from the great military theoreticians of the
past.

The main strategic concepts of the Soviet military

today were formed in the 1930's, and successfully or not have
been applied to the nuclear environment.

These concepts

include:
1. Commitment to a general balance among the different
branches of service and close cooperation among them
in battle.
2. Rejection of excessive reliance on any single weapon
or branch.
3. Emphasis upon mass both for forces in being and in
battle.
4. Stress upon the importance of maintaining the
initiative and a belief in the offensive as
the decisive form of combat.
5. Preference for geographically extensive and highly
mobile operations.
The top-level reassessment of military thinking ordered
in 1956 soon concluded that nuclear missiles would be
decisive in any future war.

In accordance with this decision

the military published many works exploring nuclear war
issues during the 1960's.

Purely conventional war

possibilities received no more than a perfunctory mention for
several years.

These early works have been modified in later

writings, but to a large extent are still relevant to Soviet
military thinking.

Presented here is a summary of the doctrine formulated
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and refined between 1956 and 1984 by the Soviet military.
The following list of assumptions, goals, and means of
achieving goals is drawn from Sokolovskiy1s Military
Strategy, and statements by Marshall Malinovsky.

I believe

it accurately depicts the Soviet military writings of the
1960's as a whole.

ASSUMPTIONS
-War between the superpowers will escalate to general nuclear
war if they become involved in a local conflict.
-Nuclear war is most likely to begin with massive, possibly
surprise, nuclear rocket strikes.
5
-Capitalism will start the war if there is one.
-The initial stages of a nuclear war will be decisive.6
7
-Victory is possible.
o

-Nuclear rockets will be the decisive weapon.
GOALS
-Total defeat of the armed forces of the enemy.
-"Disorganisation" of the enemy's interior zone.
-Suppression of the enemy's will to resist.
-Aid to the people to free them from the yoke of imperialism.
g
-Successful repulsion of attack by any aggressor.
MEANS OF ACHIEVING GOALS
PRE-WAR
-The building of superior armed forces in all respects.
Quantitative, qualitative-Qdoctrinal and strategic thought
superiority are included.
-Readiness.
"Soviet military doctrine considers the most
important, the main and paramount task of the Armed Forces to
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be in constant readiness for the reliable repulse of a
surprise,attack of the enemy and to frustrate his criminal
plans."

ONCE WAR STARTS
-"Mass nuclear rocket strikes will be of decisive importance
for the attainment of goals in future world war.
The
infliction of these assaults will be the main, decisive
method of waging war."
-"These troops (Strategic Rocket Forces) can, if necessary,
be used for the solution of the main strategic missions of
the war, the destruction of the aggressor's means of nuclear
attack -- the basis of his military might— for the
destruction of the main groupings of his armed forces, as
well as for the destruction of all vitally important enemy
objectives."
-"The execution of these tasks by the Rocket Troops will
create the conditions for conducting successful operations by
other services of the Armed Forces, for defending the
interior of the country against enemy nuclear attack and for
rapidly attaining the militaryjgolitical and strategic goals
of the war and final victory."

In the pre-war period the economy is of prime
importance in preparing for war.
imperatives become decisive.

15

Once war starts, military
The primary source of

military strength is the nuclear rocket;

the path to

military victory is through defeat of the enemy's nuclear
rocket force.

Reading the military works that present these ideas
often lends an aggressive tint to Soviet thinking.

This

impression is reinforced by references to preemptive strikes.
In this regard (decisiveness of the initial
period) the main problem is the development

9

of methods for reliably repelling a surprise
nuclear attack as well as methods of
frustrating the aggressive designs of the
enemy by the timely infliction of a
shattering attack upon him.
Taken out of context this statement seems threatening;

but,

if taken as a whole, Soviet doctrine is clearly defensively
oriented although this is often to be achieved through
offensive action.

This combination of a defensive doctrine

with an offensive strategy has proven troublesome to both the
writers and the readers of Soviet doctrine.

Among the

defensive features are the lack of any statements advocating
a nuclear war and outright condemnation of preventive wars.
Preemption is presented as a defensive measure to be taken
only when it is certain the enemy is preparing to strike.

17

Westerners find Soviet references to the possibility of
victory a disturbing aspect of Soviet thought, and indicative
of Soviet willingness to start a nuclear war.

However,

believing that victory is theoretically possible and
believing one actually possesses that ability are different
matters.

Soviet writings concluded victory was a possibility

very early, when the USSR was markedly inferior in nuclear
weapons.

Also, Soviet writings note the certainty of

enormous losses in a nuclear war, even for the victor.

Even

so, the feasibility of fighting and winning a general nuclear
war, should one be foisted upon them, is the subject matter
of Soviet military writings.

10

B.

Doctrinal Modifications

Several doctrinal modifications occurred between 1960
and 1968.

In the third edition of Military Strategy.

published in 1968, the most widespread change occurred in
chapter two, which deals with Western perceptions and
theories.

These changes have been explained both as an

analysis of "flexible response" and as a front for allowing
the author to discuss views and ideas which can not be
presented as his own.

A more specific change is the

elevation of nuclear rocket submarines to equality with the
strategic rocket forces.

18

Aid to nonsocialist states

fallen victim to imperialist aggression is upgraded from
"support" to "military support."

19

Changes in other works support and go beyond the
changes found in Sokolovskiy.

An important change from the

fourth to the fifth edition of Marxism- Leninism on War and
the Army reads...

"(doctrine)

does not deny the important

significance of other kinds of weapons..."

to "...the

possibility in certain circumstances of conducting combat
actions without the use of the nuclear weapon."

20

The change here is in the type of war being considered.
While the nuclear revolution overshadowed conventional forces
the military always maintained that they remained essential.
Previous to this conventional forces were depicted in a
follow-up role.

They were to be employed in the wake of the
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massive nuclear exchange which would both begin the war and
accomplish the main strategic missions.

Assuming that even

one battle could remain fully conventional represents a
significant increase in the role of conventional forces, and
additional complexity in the role of nuclear weapons.

That

same year Communist of the Armed Forces carried an article
which said:
The point is that the new possibilities of
waging armed struggle (meaning for using
conventional forces) have arisen not in spite
of, but because of, the nuclear missile
weapons••.

In 1974 Marshall Grechko gave more explicit support to
wars of national liberation, and revealed a Soviet desire to
project military power.

Earlier works are concerned solely

with the defense of the Soviet Union.
At the present stage the historic function of
the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to
their function in defending our Motherland
and the other socialist countries.••
..(the Soviet State) supports the national
liberation struggle, and resolutely resist
imperialists' aggression in whateve^distant
region of our planet it may appear.
The articles and books of Admiral Gorshkov during this same
time period deal at length with the need to project military
power abroad, and the usefulness of a strong navy in this
regard.

A change with many implications relating to both the
non-inevitability theme and the possibility of victory is the
changing assessment of the general character of a future war.
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In the early 1960's war is seen as not inevitable, but if a
war occurs it would inevitably be a world nuclear rocket war,
and would almost certainly begin with mass nuclear rocket
strikes.

In the late 1960's the scenario became complicated

with the idea that a war might open with a conventional
phase, but would inevitably escalate to a general nuclear
war.

By 1979 the possibility of a purely conventional

superpower war is being contemplated.

23

In a book published

in 1982 purely conventional war discussion is introduced as a
new principle and a response to Western theories of
escalation control.

24

Additional weight is lent to conventional-only ideas by
a 1984 interview with Marshall Ogarkov in which he says that
the decreasing possibilities for a disarming first-strike and
the increasing size of nuclear arsenals have combined to make
nuclear war very unlikely.

The Marshall goes on to suggest

that a future war will most likely be fought by conventional
forces armed with the latest in high-technology;

including

weapons based on new principles, whose accuracy and power
will bring them much closer to weapons of mass destruction
than any current conventional weapons.

25

Although the military is heavily involved in the arms
control process no theoretical literature on the subject has
26
emerged.
I think it is safe to say that the military
accepts arms control grudgingly and with suspicion.
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C.

The Dissenting View

Not all theoreticians of the 1960's subscribed to the
views outlined above.

Disagreement over the focus of

doctrine is evident from statements such as this one from
Major General Nikolai Talenskiy in 1965.

(He was editor of

Military Thought in the 1950's, retired from the military in
1958),27
In our days there is no more dangerous
illusion than the idea that thermonuclear war
can still serve as an instrument of politics,
that it is possible to achieve political aims
by using2guclear weapons and still
survive.
By questioning the possibility of victory Talenskiy brings
the whole basis of Soviet military doctrine into question.
It is not clear to me whether he is referring to just the
(then) present nuclear balance or recommending a future
course of action.

It is possible to see the current situation as
unwinnable but to still believe it is proper to pursue a
course of action which may make victory achievable.

Another

course would be to assume that the situation is basically
unchangeable, making the lack of victory a permanent feature.
One could also believe that pursuing victory is dangerous in
itself, and likely to lead to war, independent of beliefs on
the possibility of victory.

Talenskiy seems to be challenging the focus on striving

14

for a war winning capability.

By denying the political

utility of nuclear war he challenges the Marxist analysis on
the nature of war,

(which defines war by class essence, not

types of weapons) and the impact of nuclear weapons on war.
To the adherents of the more traditional line the main change
brought about by nuclear weapons lies in their ability to
achieve strategic missions directly, without relying on the
cumulative effects of tactics and operations.
seen as other wars are seen—

Nuclear war is

a rather destructive way of

achieving political goals.

Talenskiy says nuclear war can not serve political
ends.

Other statements are more clearly descriptive and do

not necessarily challenge the theoretical possibility of
victory, although that may have been their intent.
Everyone knows that in contemporary
conditions in an armed conflict of
adversaries comparatively equal in power (in
number and especially in quality of weapons)
an immediate retaliatory strike of enormous
destructive power is inevitable.
With the existing level of development of
nuclear missile weapons and their reliable
cover below ground and under water it is
impossible in practice to destroy them
completely, and consequently it is also
impossible to prevent an annihilating
retaliatory strike.

The key phrases are "contemporary conditions" and
"existing level of development."

Mr.

Garthoff picked these

passages from Military Thought as those most supportive of
his argument that the Soviets wish to maintain mutual

15

deterrence.

However, they merely describe their author*s

perception of the then existing nuclear balance, without
making recommendations.

It is entirely consistent to

recognize the existing situation as one of mutual deterrence
on one page and extoll the merits of striving for
superiority/ victory on another, if it is believed that
mutual deterrence is a temporary, not necessary, relationship
between large nuclear powers.

This means that while Mr.

Garthoff has shown that some Soviets accept the current
situation as one of mutual deterrence, he does not show that
they wish to maintain such a relationship.

Throughout the 1960's the Soviet military fully
maintained the view that nuclear war can be successfully
waged.

Superior forces are seen as both necessary and

realistically achievable.

While Talenskiy has the military

background to qualify as military, he was not on active duty
anymore.

Even Talenskiy does not support a minimum deterrent

view, which could be arrived at from the above quotes.

It

would seem that equality as an acceptable minimum is the most
radical view that can be inferred, and this only outside the
actual military establishment.

More often seen is the

sentiment that weapons in the West are a threat to mankind
while weapons in the hands of socialists further the cause of
peace.

16

D.

American Views Contrasted

Understanding of Soviet Doctrine is hampered by the
difference in concepts used and the basically different frame
of reference that the Soviets use in examining these issues.
Two differing assessments of Soviet intentions based on their
doctrine provide a useful contrast.
The Garthoff assessment:
1. The Soviets see deterrence as their principal military
ta'sk.
2.

The Soviets believe there is an overall balance.

3. The Soviets wish to maintain this balance (parity as a
go a l ) .
4. The Soviets believe negotiations can help maintain the
balance.
The Pipes assessment:
1.

The Soviets seek victory, not deterrence.

2.

The Soviets seek superiority, not sufficiency.

3.

The Soviets study the offensive, not retaliation.

4.
Soviet doctrine has 5 main elements:
pre-emption,
superiority, counterforce, combined arms, and defenseBalance, negotiate, and sufficiency are not present.

Even among authors as divergent as these two there is
some agreement.

Both agree that the Soviets see the current

situation as one of mutual deterrence,

(each side possesses a

sufficiently large, secure, second strike capability?
attacker has nothing to gain)

an

and that war-fighting and

assured destruction are not mutually exclusive, separable
strategies to the Soviets.

17

Deterrence is a key concept in thinking about nuclear
war, but it has developed differently in the U.S. and the
USSR.

The word, deterrence, has no direct equivalent in the

Russian language.
sderzhivanie

In the 1950's and early 1960's

(keeping out)

is used to describe Soviet policy

while ustrashenie (intimidation)
Western deterrence.
been used.

is often used to describe

Since the 1960's ustrashenie has seldom

The English words deterrence and containment both

translate to sderzhivanie, thus confusing two distinct
concepts•

This little language problem is indicative of the
confusion in this area.

Garthoff is correct when he asserts

the principal task of the Soviet forces is deterrence.
However, the Soviets consider the best deterrent to be the
ability to win.

This idea belongs to what I would call

traditional military thinking and is not strongly related to
the Western intellectual concepts of mutual deterrence and
stability, which are products of the peculiarities of nuclear
weapons.

The concepts of mutual deterrence and stability are not
present in Soviet writings.

Mutual deterrence

(a belief by

the Soviets that America should maintain a credible deterrent
and vice versa)

is not a desirable goal the Soviets pursue,

but a situation which they agree currently exists.

Mutual

deterrence as elaborated in MAD theory is the best_ possible
solution.

No Soviet writings endorse this concept.

18

Deterrence to the Soviets is not something to be pursued but
rather a by-product of successfully performed military and
political/diplomatic tasks.

33

To say that deterrent and war-fighting strategies are
not dichotomous to the Soviets might imply that they are in
the U.S. way of thinking, but that is not true.

Some

U.S. officials view the relation between deterrence and
war-fighting capabilities much the same as the Soviets.

In

his Fiscal Year 1981 posture statement Secretary of Defense
Brown said:
There is no contradiction between this
attention to the militarily effective
targeting of the large and flexible forces we
increasingly possess— to how we could fight a
war, if need be— and our primary^and
overriding policy of deterrence.
Elsewhere in the same statement Brown contends
popular belief)

(contrary to

that the U.S. has never pursued a deterrent

strategy to the exclusion of a war-fighting strategy.
It has never been U.S. policy to limit
ourselves to massive counter-city operations
in retaliation, nor have our plans been so
circumscribed.
For nearly twenty years, we
have explicitly included a range of
employment options•..
....In particular, we have always considered
it important, in the event of war, to be able
to attack the forces that could do-damage to
the United States and its allies.

Pipes' assertion is also correct.

Soviet doctrine

calls for the ability to win, since such ability is seen as
the best deterrent to aggression.

To repeat myself somewhat,
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one must

bear in mind that desiring the ability to win is

not

the same as believing it has been achieved, and does not
necessarily imply a willingness to use such an ability should
it be achieved.

The Soviet concept of deterrence seems identical to the
traditional concept of defense.

Defense is best achieved by

having forces clearly capable of emerging victorious from any
conceivable conflict.

While nuclear weapons have given rise

to new ideas the age old conception of defense has not been
discarded by either side.

Developed in a pre-atomic world,

the concept of defense is very much at odds with ideas such
as mutual vulnerability being an acceptable state of affairs.

On
says the

the question of maintaining the balance, Garthoff
Soviets want to keep it while Pipes argues they

desire superiority and study offensive possibilities, not
retaliation.

While it is true that most Soviets accept that

a rough balance exists

(in the form of minimal first strike

incentive on both sides), none see it any more favorably than
an acceptable minimum.

David Holloway states this clearly in

The Soviet Union and the Arms R a c e .

The Soviets would not accept an inferior
position, therefore an assured destruction
capability was not enough.
Both the ambition
to attain superiority and the recognition of
mutual vulnerability were present in Soviet
thinking in the 6 0 *s but a choice became
necessary only with the attainment of parity.
The choice was not one of principles, for
clearly superiority would be desirable.
It
was forced by the practical considerations

20

that pursuit of superiority might prove
extremely costly, and ultimately
unsuccessful*

Parity, equivalence, or a balance became desirable to
the Soviets as the best political solution available at the
moment.

Military writings continue to worry about problems

such as the possibility of defense and victory, and parity
provides no help to them.
enthusiasm for parity.

Military figures show little

On the other hand, there is a clear

trend in political statements showing a shift from advocacy
of superiority to acceptance of parity.

Acceptance of parity does not mean the Soviets accepted
the absolute value of deterrence.
and the military must be prepared.

War could still happen,
This is why Pipes'

assertion concerning study of the offensive is true.

Much

Soviet literature does concern itself with the possibilities
of offensive nuclear operations.

This is not necessarily an

indication of aggressive thinking, as Pipes suggests, but the
result of certain assumptions.

Soviet doctrine assumes that

a nuclear war might be launched by the West.
fails what do you do?
threat.

If deterrence

Retaliation is useful only as a

Once the threat fails and the enemy launches a

nuclear strike retaliation will not remedy the situation.
is nothing more than revenge.

The question of how to fight and win a war generally
means a study of offensive possibilities.

Purely defensive

It

21

operations by their nature offer no answers on how to defeat
the enemy and end the war.

Because of the immense

destructive power of nuclear weapons, winning means
preventing the enemy from launching any sizable portion of
his missiles

(given the lack of ABM systems).

either preventive war or a preemptive strike.

This means
Preventive war

is what the Soviets accuse the West of plotting and
specifically denounce in their writings.

Since the Soviets

assume the West will "begin" the war a preemptive strike is
their only "defense."

The Soviet attitude toward negotiations and arms
control is another point of contention.

The record of

agreements is testimony to their sincerity, but motivations
are hard to determine.

Statements of ideology seem the best

guide here, for I have not found a rationale of arms control
per se.

The Soviets do not actively seek to maintain parity

through negotiations.

They want the best deal possible and

would accept an advantage.
benefit, not ours.

They negotiate for their own

Negotiations are seen as an adversary

relationship, with each side out only for itself, not as a
conscious attempt to maintain MAD criteria.

Arms control does not mitigate the historical struggle
between capitalism and communism and does not signify
acceptance of the status quo.

Nuclear doctrine reflects the

idea that these two ideologies are competing, that the
superior nature of socialism assures its victory, and that

22

this victory cannot be prevented by the capitalists launching
a nuclear war.

Further insight into the Soviet view can be obtained
from the two terms "correlation of forces" and "equal
security."

Both somewhat reflect the Soviet mindset.

security is mainly an arms control term.

Equal

It expresses the

Soviet desire to account for more factors than bilateral bean
counting allows.

The entire range of strategic questions

defined by the Soviets)

(as

are to be considered together. t The

Soviets include Europe and their Eastern borders in strategic
calculations and, not surprisingly, wish to offset NATO and
Chinese weapons.

The effect of this approach is to allow the

USSR more weapons than the U.S. due to our having nuclear
friends while Russia does not.

Although this is undoubtedly

used as a negotiating tactic, it also reflects a Soviet
fondness for the macro view.

Correlation of forces is the term used to denote the
total power distribution in the world.

The quality of

planning, morale of the troops and nation, justness of the
cause, choosing the proper moment, geography, and economic
success are among the factors affecting the correlation of
forces.

Weapons are a factor but are not seen as

overshadowing all others.

Soviet references to victory are often in the same vein
as these terms.

Victory is seen as coming not just from

23

military prowess, but from the superiority of the socialist
system.

In the Soviet view war is not just a military

contest, but a political and social system contest.
Everything is at stake;
outcome.

everything plays a role in the

The possibilities for and capabilities of the armed

forces are inextricably linked to the society they serve.
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CHAPTER II
ANOTHER VIEW OF DOCTRINE

The proper relationship between the military and the
party leadership is laid out in the Soviet definitions of
doctrine and military science.

Doctrine is a political

perogativef but counts military science among the factors
considered in its formulation.

Doctrine is supposed to

provide guidelines for the further development of military
science.

As I understand it, this subordination of military

science to doctrine means that military science should be
looking for ways to implement the politically determined
doctrine.

In this chapter I will examine the speeches of the
First

(or General)

Secretary to each Party Congress between

1956 and 1981 to determine the position of the Party
leadership on nuclear war issues.

Speeches to the Party

Congress are appropriate because they present a position
worked out among the top leaders for dissemination to the
whole Party and nation.

Such speeches would not be designed

for Western consumption.
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For clarity and ease of comparison it seems best to
present each Congress speech separately by the position taken
on several recurring themes.

This method will allow

isolation of the interesting elements.

As with the writings

examined in chapter one, important changes can occur with
only two or three words.

Sometimes a speech is more notable

for what it does not say than for what it does.

The five

themes I will examine are closely interrelated.

When

possible I will present them as discrete ideas, but
especially for the later Congresses this is not possible.
The five themes are:
1. General assessment of
This is taken largely
sets the tone of each
statements from later

the international scene.
from the opening section which
Congress. Where appropriate,
sections are included.

2. Attitude towards the arms race.
a. who is at fault?
b. proposed action concerning.
c. perceived effects of.
3. Likelihood of nuclear war occurring.
a. forces pushing for war.
b. forces against war and relative importance of each.
4. Expected results should a nuclear war occur.
a. Is victory possible?
b. Level of destruction involved.
5. Attitude toward negotiation.
a. Are proposals specific?
b. Are they mentioned once or often?
c. What importance is attached to them in general
and specific terms?

The 20th Party Congress

(1956)

Khrushchev summarizes the three years after Stalin*s

29

death in 1953 as a period of tension giving way to relaxation
at some point prior to the Congress.

The easing of tension

is attributed to the policies of the Soviet Union and friends
while the West is blamed for the arms race, the cold war, and
pursuing a "positions of strength" policy.

In general the

imperialists have been aggravating international
relations

In blaming the arms race on the U.S., Khrushchev cites
the recent jSoviet troop reductions and several Soviet
proposals as evidence of Soviet good intentions.

The

proposals mentioned include a nuclear weapons test ban.

The

arms race is condemned only on the grounds that it increases
the probability of war.

After noting the failure of the West

to respond adequately to Russia's desire for disarmament
Khrushchev states:
The peace-loving states naturally had to draw
appropriate conclusions from this situation
and to continue reinforcing the security of
their countries.

At this Congress Khrushchev introduces the idea that
war is no longer to be considered inevitable, although as
long as imperialism exists the possibility of war remains.
Imperialism is said to be weakened while the forces of
socialism grow ever stronger.

The primary force preventing

war is the working people of the world.
If the working class comes out as a united,
organized force and acts with firm
resolution, there will be no war.

Now there is
has become a
peace forces
the material

a world camp of socialism which
mighty force.
In this camp the
have not only the moral but also
means to prevent aggression.

Khrushchev makes some rather strong comments on the
probable results of nuclear war that are somewhat confused.
Rather than attempt to sort out the pieces a rather long
quote seems appropriate.
Should their (capitalist countries) rulers
dare to precipitate such a war, the working
class and the broad masses of working people
of the capitalist countries would undoubtedly
draw decisive conclusions regarding a system
which periodically plunges the nations into
the bloodbath of war.
It is not by chance that in recent
times prominent bourgeois figures more and
more often admit frankly "there can be no
victor in an atomic war."
These public
figures still do not venture to state that
capitalism will find its grave in another
world war, should it unleash one, but they
are already obliged to admit openly that the
socialist camp is invincible.
However confusing the details of this statement might be it
clearly gives the USSR the upper hand in a nuclear conflict.

Not a lot of space is devoted to negotiations, but they
are said to be the method by which international relations
should be conducted.

Specific proposals include a nuclear

weapons test ban, no nuclear weapons in the two Germanies,
and mutual military budget cuts.

These and other measures

are presented as a hopeful first step toward general
disarmament.
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21st Congress 1959

Rather than review the period since the 20th Congress
Khrushchev opens with predictions of how the coming seven
year plan will affect international relations.

The general

thrust is that the economic superiority of socialism will
soon become obvious to all, and will have far-reaching
effects.

The arms race is blamed on the West, but there is no
mention of Soviet defense expenditures.
arms race is solely on economic grounds;

Condemnation of the
no mention of it

increasing the danger of war is made.

This Congress repeats the previous one regarding the
likelihood of nuclear war.

Although it remains a possibility

there are "tremendous forces" working against it.

The 21st

Congress seems to be concerned with little besides economic
plans and possibilities.

Khrushchev contends that as a

result of the coming seven year plan, "there will be created
real possibilities for eliminating war as a means of settling
international issues."**

The emphasis on the "masses" as a

force for peace is not present in this speech.

Economic

success is presented as the golden key to all things.

Should the imperialists attempt a nuclear war
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compels other countries to expend
considerable funds to strengthen their own
defenses•

Aggressive American actions are said to have increased
the threat of war.

The forces preventing war change somewhat

to give greater credit to the State and Party.
non-inevitability of war is reaffirmed.

The

The possibility of

peace can only be a reality with "activeness on the part of
all forces for peace."

20

In a section denouncing the West

German revanchists and their war plans Brezhnev repeats the
idea that nuclear war will be the end of capitalism.

He also

stresses the need to prevent a surprise attack, and to ensure
that retaliation "descends on them irrevocably and without
delay."

21

Negotiations receive fairly little attention but

several specific proposals are mentioned.

The utility of

negotiating is to lessen the threat of war and lead to more
comprehensive agreements.

24th Congress

(1971)

The description of international relations as
confrontation between two lines, one for peace and freedom,
the other for war and oppression, is nearly identical to the
22nd and 23rd Congress openings.
capitalism has deepened.

As always the crisis of

The unchanging aggressive and

reactionary nature of capitalism is also repeated.
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Brezhnev gives dollar amounts for U.S. and NATO
military expenditures, and says that "in the post-war years
militarism in the capitalist world has been growing on an
unprecedented scale."

22

Unlike the 22nd and 23rd there is

no accompanying statement on what this means to the Soviet
defense effort.

Negotiations are presented as the solution.

We are conducting negotiations with the
U.S.A. on the limitation of strategic
armaments.
The favorable outcome of these
talks would make it possible to avoid another
round in the missile arms race and to free
substantial resources for constructive
purposes.
We are working toward positive
results in these negotiations.
The lessening of war danger as a benefit of negotiations is
also mentioned more than once.

The prevention of nuclear war is now said to be "the
vital task of all peace-loving states, of all peoples."

24

The international workers movement is now referred to as the
"militant vanguard of the revolutionary forces", but it is
not mentioned in connection with nuclear war.

25

Brezhnev

sums up the elements preventing war:
We have everything necessary— an honest
policy of peace, military might, the
solidarity of the Soviet people— to ensure
the inviolability of our borders against any
encroachments and to defend the gains of
socialism.
No mention is made of nuclear war being the end of
capitalism, and there are no references to how destructive a
nuclear war might be.

Negotiations are the heart of the

Congress despite the relatively bad characterization of
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imperialism.

Brezhnev outlines a "peace program" with all

the main points depending on negotiations for successful
implementation.

The peace program is supposed to be the

means for implementing the policy of peaceful coexistence.

25th Congress

(1976)

Description of the international climate takes on a
much more optimistic tone in this Congress than in any
previous one.
Although world peace is still by no means
guaranteedf we have every reason to say with
confidence that the improvement in the
international climate is convincing evidence
that the achievement of lasting peace is not
merely a good intention but a realistic
aim.
The above quote is the new improved version of the old "war
is not inevitable" theme, which does not appear at this
Congress.

It says basically the same thing but stresses the

possibility of peace rather than of war.

Instead of taking

every opportunity to denounce capitalism for its aggressive,
reactionary nature, Brezhnev is now content to state that
"its nature remains the same."

28

In the 22nd and 23rd

Congress there were many references to "the imperialists',"
or "the imperialist states and their leaders" when assigning
blame for warmongering and other assorted unsavory
activities.

In the 25th the international situation is

certainly not all rosy, but problems in Soviet relations with
the West are attributed to "influential forces", not the
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state as a whole.

The arms race is said to be intensifying due to the
efforts of aggressive imperialist circles, but the
response is totally different from the 22nd/23rd and says
outright what could be implied from the 24th.
The Soviet Union is not increasing its
military budget;
it is not reducing, but is
steadily increasing, appropriationsgfor
improving the people's well-being.
The arms race is condemned for endandering the peace, and on
economic grounds.

In connection with a proposal to limit

certain systems Brezhnev says this would increase mutual
confidence, and thus both aid future dealings and lessen the
danger of war.

Not surprisingly he declares that the danger

of war has been decreasing, due largely to improved relations
with the U.S.

At the same time he issues a warning

concerning U.S. policies that attempt to interfere with
"internal affairs."

There is no mention of either the

results of a nuclear war or the damage that would be
incurred.

Since the 20th Congress when Khrushchev announced the
peaceful coexistence program, all Congresses have supported
this as what the Soviet Union would prefer.

The 22nd and

23rd basically said that because of Western actions the
Soviet Union was forced away from this course of action.

The

25th says that although an intense struggle remains,
relations between the opposing systems have started down the
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path of peaceful coexistence.

Vladivostok and Helsinki are

both cited as part of this trend.

Most opposition to the

peace path is found in capitalist circles, but internal
opposition is also mentioned.
The transition from the cold war and the
explosive confrontation of two worlds to the
easing of tension was connected above all
with changes in the alignment of forces in
the world arena.
But a great deal of effort
was required for people— especially those who
direct state policy— to become accustomed to
the thought that the natural thing is not
balancing on the brink of war but
negotiations on disputed questions, not 3 Q
confrontation but peaceful cooperation.
In addition to the emphasis given negotiations, the heralding
of achievements thus far, and endorsement of the peace
program from the 24th Congress, this Congress is the first to
mention specific weapon systems
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(Trident and B - l).

26th Congress

(1981)

International relations is full of twists and turns.
The glowing possibilities perceived in the 25th Congress
withered on the vine somewhat by the 26th.

The general

assessment section returns to the "two lines" approach.

I

believe the opponents and proponents of peace and detente are
clear without repeating this assessment.
spending is once more unprecedented.

U.S. military

Washington is accused

of attempting to upset the strategic balance and to "enmesh
the world in a web of US bases, airfields and arms
depots •
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The arms race remains a major problem but takes on
dimensions never before attributed to it with the
introduction of new (to Party Congress speeches) concepts.
Parity as a desirable goal is clearly endorsed.
The military-strategic equilibrium that
exists between the USSR and the US and
between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO
objectively serves to preserve peace on our
planet.
We have not sought, and do not now
seek, military superiority over the other
side.
This is not our policy.
But neither
will we allow such superiority to be created
over us.
The arms race itself is stressed as a danger, without placing
blame on anyone.

Although the arms race had been condemned

as a war danger in some previous Congresses it was always in
connection with the imperialists causing the arms race.

In

this passage the arms race is presented as a disembodied
phenomenon which the U.S. and Russia must combat together.
The danger of war does indeed hang over the
US, as it does over all other countries in
the world.
But its source is not the Soviet
Union, not its mythical superiority, but the
arms race itself and the continuing tension
in the world.
We are prepared to combat this
genuine, not imaginary, danger— hand in hand
with America, with the European states, with
all countries on our planet.
To try to
prevail over the other side in the arms race
or to count on victory in a nuclear war is
dangerous madness.
The action/reaction phenomenon is recognized somewhat, as is
the idea of the uselessness of a further mutual build-up.
Now for nuclear missiles in Europe.
An
increasingly dangerous stockpiling of these
weapons is underway.
A kind of vicious
circle has formed:
The actions of one side
draw countermeasures ffom the other.
How can
this chain be broken?
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As a result, (of the failure of the Soviet
proposal to ban Trident and its Soviet
counterpart) the Americans have created a new
submarine, the Ohio, armed with Trident-1
missiles.
An analagous system— the Typhoon
— has been created in our country.
Well, who
has gained?

The likelihood of war has increased since the 25th
Congress but the real danger is seen as lying in the near
future.

Another round in the arms race would "greatly

increase the danger that war will break out."

37

The effects

of nuclear war are mentioned concerning "limited" nuclear war
in Europe.

Such ideas are said to be a "deception."

According to Brezhnev a "limited" nuclear war in Europe would
mean the end of European civilization.

"And, needless to

say, the United States itself would be unable to escape the
flames of war."
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In the face of increased war danger and the
unwinnability of nuclear war socialism can still defend
itself.
The Central Committee reports to the Congress
that the military- political defensive
alliance of the socialist countries is
faithfully serving the cause of peace.
It
has everything necessary to reliably defend
the peoples' socialist gains.
Andgwe will do
everything to keep this the case!

According to the Soviet explanations of doctrine the
military view should conform to the political requirements.
It is not totally accurate to use political statements for
the political side of doctrine and military statements for
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the military-technical side.

A few political statements deal

with the military side and quite often military statements
deal with the political side of doctrine.

However,the

general principle that the military works within the
framework given it by the Party leadership can be tested by
such a division.

Do the military writings parallel the

political attitude?
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CHAPTER III
AGREEING TO DISAGREE

The relationship between the military and the party on
questions of doctrine might be compared to a mother dragging
a reluctant child through the supermarket.

Although there is

no doubt that the mother is in control, the child accepts as
little as possible of her control.

While the Soviet military

is not so innocuous as a child it does appear to have a mind
of its own.

New positions or ideas are adopted slowly, and

do not necessarily follow the Party line.

Examples of this

occur under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

It seems to be part of the Soviet style to provide the
appearance of continuity in thought and action no matter how
awkward this becomes upon examination.

Speaking at the 22d

(1961) Party Congress Defense Minister Malinovskiy heartily
praises the doctrine outlined by Khrushchev before the fourth
session of the Supreme Soviet

(Jan. 1960).

After

complimenting Khrushchev on his astute explication of the
essence of modern warfare Malinovskiy proceeds to disagree
with him on no less than five crucial points.
disagreement are:
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The points of
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1.

Surprise.

2.

Deterrence.

3.

Pre-emption.

4.

The value of conventional forces.

5.

The likelihood of war occurring.

The appearance of agreement rests upon their common
endorsement of the following points:
1.
Should war occur between the superpowers it will
inevitably take the form of nuclear rocket war.
2.
Such a war would be unprecedented in the scale of
destruction involved.
3.
Said war would destroy capitalism;
emerge victorious.

socialism would

The points of disagreement, though approached
indirectly, are much more substantial.

Consider Khrushchev's

statements on the problem of surprise attack.
...could they (imperialists/USA) not
perfidiously attack us first, in order to
take advantage of the factor of a surprise
attack by such terrible weapons as atomic
rockets and thereby gain an advantage for
ensuring victory?
No.
The present-day means
of warfare do not give such advantages to any
side.
The state that has been suddenly
attacked— if, of course, it is a sufficiently
large state— will always be able to give the
aggressor a proper rebuff.
We are establishing such a system that
if some means of retaliation are destroyed,
it will always be possible to put others into
operation and strike targets from reserve
positions.

In American terminology Khrushchev is advocating a
deterrent strategy which relies upon the ability to absorb an
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enemy first strike and still retaliate with surviving
systems, thereby destroying the incentive for a first strike
and preventing war from occurring.

In pure form such a

strategy does not deal with how to fight or win a war.
Malinovskiy reaches different conclusions on the importance
of surprise and supports a very different strategy.
The Presidium of the Party Central
Committee and the Soviet government have
called upon us to pay special attention to
the initial phase of a possible war.
The
reason why this phase is important is that
the very first massed nuclear blows can to an
enormous extent predetermine the whole
subsequent course of the war and result in
such losses in the rear and in the armed
forces that the people and country will find
themselves in an exceptionally difficult
situation.
A realistic assessment of the picture
would lead one to believe that what the
imperialists are preparing is a surprise
nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R. and the
socialist countries.
Hence Soviet military
doctrine regards it as the most important,
the pre-eminent, the first-priority task of
the armed forces to be in a state of constant
readiness for effectively repulsing a
surprise attack by the enemy and thwarting
his criminal designs.
Malinovskiy assigns crucial importance to surprise where
Khrushchev degrades its role.

As a remedy Malinovskiy

recommends a strategy based on preemption, very definitely
opposing the First Secretary.

Consider another pair of quotes from the same speeches,
first from Khrushchev and then Malinovskiy.
Our state has a powerful rocket
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technology.
Given the present development of
military technologyr military aviation and
the navy have lost their former importance.
This type of armament is not being reduced
but replaced.
We have now sharply reduced
and probably will further reduce and even
halt production of bombers and other obsolete
equipment•
In our time a country's defense
capacity is determined not by the number of
a
soldiers it has under arms, ....
country's defense capacity depends to a
decisive extent on the firepower and means of
delivery it has.

Although nuclear weapons will hold the
decisive place in a future war, we are
nevertheless coming to the conclusion that
final victory over an aggressor can be
achieved only through combined operations by
all branches of the armed forces...
We also believe that under modern
conditions any future war would be waged,
despite enormous losses, by mass, manymillions-strong armed forces.
The disagreement is obvious.

While agreeing on the

importance of the nuclear rocket weapon each draws very
different meaning from its importance, and different ideas on
force composition.

On the very basic, and supposedly

accepted, principle of war no longer being inevitable,
Malinovskiy manages to disagree without actually violating
the principle.

Khrushchev points out that the imperialists

have no advantage, even if surprise is achieved, and
therefore an attack is most unlikely.

Malinovskiy insists

that surprise is a tremendous advantage, and that the West is
preparing to launch a surprise nuclear strike.

Last but not

least, Khrushchev refers to the economic aspects of the
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nuclear arms race while Malinovskiy shows no interest in this
consideration, preferring to concentrate on the overwhelming
need to prepare for a nuclear war at any cost.

Rather than isolated examples I think these two
speeches are representative of the views held and
consistently presented by their respective authors and the
groups they represent.

Presented by Scott as complementary

views, with Malinovskiy merely "fleshing out" Khrushchev's
general statements, these speeches can be deceptive.

My

examination illustrates that agreement is only skin deep,
while at the heart of matters two diametrically opposing
views are being presented.

Brezhnev never advocated the minimum deterrent view
that Khrushchev promoted;
buildup.

he initially preferred a military

While at least initially interested in strengthing

the military, Brezhnev had his differences with the military
view.

At the 23rd Congress

(1966) he repeated the idea that

a nuclear war would be the end of capitalism, but that was
the last Congress to mention it.
sessions,

At the later Congress

references to the value of arms control

negotiations take the place of the conspicuously absent
condemnations of capitalist efforts to start a nuclear war
and assertions of socialist superiority.

The 24th Congress
than this:

(1971) makes no stronger statement

"We cannot consider that the threat of a new
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world war has been fully eliminated."

5

In a Jan. 1977

speech at Tula Brezhnev declared:
The Soviet Union's defense potential should
be sufficient to deter anyone from disturbing
our peaceful life.
Not a course aimed at
superiority in armaments but a course aimed
at their reduction, at lessening nuclear
confrontation — that is our policy.

The military continued to think the unthinkable.
if deterrence fails?

How do we fight and win?

In y.I„

Lenin and Soviet Military Science* published in 1981
e d ) , Colonel

(ret.)

What

(2nd

N.N. Azovetsev sees, a "firm foundation

for attaining victory," a need for superiority of forces, and
the "fact" that the West is plotting a surprise first
7
strike.

Marshall Ogarkov's entry on military strategy in the
1979 Soviet Military Encyclopedia sounds very similar to
statements of more than a decade earlier.
Soviet military strategy proceeds from the
fact that if a nuclear war is foisted upon
the 'Soviet Union, then the Soviet people and
their armed forces must be ready for the most
severe and prolonged trials.
In this case
the Soviet Union and the fraternal Socialist
states will, compared with the imperialist
states, possess certain advantages resulting
from their just war aims and the progressive
nature of their social and state order.
This
provides them with objective possibilities
for achieving victory.
However, in order for
these possibilities to be realized, the
timely and all-around preparation of the
«
country and the armed forces is necessary.

It seems clear that the standard Soviet explanation of
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doctrine being primarily determined by its political side,
with the military-technical side solving problems posed by
the political/

is not accurate.

From the beginning there has

been a military-political divergence/ or perhaps
preoccupation with different questions.

The labels "military

view" and "political view" serve a useful purpose but can be
misleading.

Like the Malinovskiy speech/ military works

often endorse the political position initially and then seem
to contradict it later on.

While it is expected that

political speeches will contain a certain amount of double
talk, military doctrine and strategy are supposed to be part
of a unified system of views and aims officially adopted by
the state.

However/ this is untrue not only in the

political/military sense, but in the lack of a consistent
military view.

While disagreements from book to book

certainly exist, perhaps the most striking examples of
conflict come from within single works.

Examining Sokolovskiy’s Military Strategy for the
definition and direction it should give on defense matters is
singularly unsatisfying.

The importance of the initial

period is stressed most heavily?

yet a surprise attack is

not seen as fatal to the Soviet Union, thus Malinovskiy and
Khrushchev are combined.

After stressing the need for a

quick victory the necessity of preparing for a prolonged
struggle is noted, again showing compromise and not decision.

"Decisive military results" are expected from the
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initial exchanges of nuclear rockets, yet victory will
require "massive multi-million armed forces."

For the two

main tasks, destruction of the enemy forces and
disorganization of his rear, no priority is given.

Both

tasks are to be pursued and achieved simultaneously.
word, no choices are made.

In a

Sokolovskiy, the center piece of

Soviet writings on this subject, has been accurately
described as a "grand compromise."

g

If Sokolovskiy shows fractures in the military view,
Admiral Gorshkov's Seapower of the State illustrates another
sort of difficulty in Soviet writings.
In the course of the First World War,
despite the growth of the scale of military
operations at sea, the fleet became
relatively less important.
A similar
position, despite the further rise in the
scale of armed conflict at sea, may also be
noted in the Second World War.
As is known,
in the course of it a decisive role was
played by the struggle on the Soviet-German
land front
Thus, analysis of the
present-day alignment of forces in the
international arena and the swift development
of navies in the post-war period give grounds
for asserting that the importance of the
struggle at sea has grown and will continue
to increase.
The Second World War showed the increased
significance of armed struggle at sea and the
strengthened link between military actions
and operations on land with actions at sea.
This reconfirmed views on the need for the
comprehensive development of the fleet as an
essential,part of the armed forces of the
country.

There are two notable oddities in these passages.

The
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first concerns the opposing views of naval contributions to
WW II.
case;

The second is that the same end is reached in each
namely that navies today are more vital than ever.

Gorshkov is sometimes seen as the prime naval proponent
in an ongoing debate on military priorities.

While he

certainly does promote the navy, one quality of a debate is
missing.

Rather than argue for a choice between two

alternatives something is argued for and nothing against.
For example, Gorshkov argues for SLBMs but does not disparage
ICBMs.

It seems to be a live-and-let-live situation among

the different branches of the military, with each promoting
itself without attacking the others.

In more recent years conflict in doctrine seems to have
increased as a result of changing views.

The change to

considering a purely conventional war possible seems to be at
odds with the assertions that should a war occur it will be a
decisive clash between opposing socio-political systems.
Given the manner in which capitalism is pictured, it is
inconsistent to propose that a "decisive” victory is possible
without any nuclear weapons being used.

In spite of the incongruity both ideas occur in
Military-Technological Progress, and the. USSR Armed Forces,
edited by Lt. General M. Kir'yan, published in 1982.
Possibly Kir'yan had little faith in the chances of a war
remaining conventional himself.

While mentioning that
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conventional war is a possibility, the subsequent elaboration
of how a future war would be fought assigns a primary role to
nuclear weapons.
For their (main missions of theatre forces)
rapid implementation, it will be essential to
make full use of the results of mass nuclear
strikes by strategic weapons.

If one plans the use of conventional forces around the
use of nuclear forces aiding them it is difficult to see how
the war could remain conventional.

The continued primacy of

the nuclear weapon also contradicts the declared Soviet
policy of no first use, which Marshall Ogarkov had endorsed
by 1979.

13

While change is occurring in Soviet doctrine I

would not expect consistency to result from it.

Disagreement could be nothing more than part of a
healthy intellectual process by which new and more refined
doctrinal positions are developed, but this does not seem to
be the case.

I think that doctrine/strategy is not thought

out from beginning to end in an objective manner, but from
end to beginning.

Each author knows what end he seeks and

has only to backtrack to the proper "starting assumptions" to
lead him to his goal.

It seems doctrine is not made

primarily for its supposed purpose of having a doctrine, but
for some other unspecified reasons.
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CHAPTER IV
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

It seems that the content of Soviet doctrine is not
very well explained as the state approved position on future
wars.

Why then is doctrine written?

authors pursuing?

What goals are the

For what reason is one position preferred

over another?

There are several possible goals and I think this
accounts for many of the inconsistencies

in Soviet doctrine.

Rather than being a single set of views for a single purpose
it seems that several purposes are being s e r v e d , resulting in
several views.

In the American literature on Soviet doctrine

I encountered several ideas about what purpose lurks behind
the facade of doctrine.

A distillation of the more plausible

ideas is presented here.

The propaganda dimension is easily noticed when read
from a Western perspective.

The standard line that the USSR

cannot be dealt with from "positions of strength"
directed outward rather than inward.

seems

This statement was much

more common in the period of marked Soviet inferiority and
fairly accurate.

The Soviets were not very interested in
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arms control until they had equality of a sort with the U.S.
Military works often include descriptions of the horror and
fantastic casualty figures of a projected nuclear war, but
always refer to such damage occurring in the West.

In those

cases where it is conceded that the USSR would suffer
terribly in a nuclear war the detailed observations remain
reserved for the opponent.

Speaking more directly are the

pointed observations that should the U.S. attempt a limited
(territorily) nuclear war, the U.S. itself would not escape
destruction.

Assertions that any superpower war would

inevitably become a general nuclear war could also be seen as
more of a warning than a prediction.

The psychological element could be seen as a
subdivision of the propaganda element.

To prevent an attack

from occurring it is necessary not only to be strong but to
let the opponent know about it.
not sufficient.

Just having nuclear bombs is

The proper resolve to use them must be shown

so a verbal and printed assault is launched to strengthen the
defenses•

In an extreme version of this idea Robert Dickson Crane
suggests that doctrine no longer serves its military function
of providing guidance but has become a weapon itself, a
psychological weapon.*

According to this view, statements

concerning victory in a nuclear war are intended to paralyze
American will to act by convincing the U.S. that the Soviets
actually would resort to nuclear war rather than be thwarted
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in their aims.

This is the obverse of viewing American

nuclear might as deterring Soviet adventurism.

Soviet

doctrine is seen as an attempt to convince the U.S. that our
deterrent will not deter them because they have their own
deterrent to deter our deterrent.

The difficulty encountered here is in trying to
determine if nuclear strength is capable of conferring any
benefits on the owner other than the ability to deter a first
strike by the other side.

This idea pictures the threat of

nuclear war as a game of nerves on an international scale.
The object is to intimidate the other player into not
interfering with your objectives even though he has the
capability to do so.

If the game is thought of as Russian

roulette then Soviet doctrine would be the Soviet player
appearing to put another bullet in the revolver before
handing it to the American player.

This concept explains doctrinal contradictions as in
the nature of "psychostrategy."

Each threat exerts a

different pressure on the enemy so that what is militarily
contradictory becomes complementary in psychostrategy.

An

example could be the emphasis on both long and short war
preparations, or the need for both massive armies and nuclear
rockets.

This perspective has some merit since deterrence

rests on perceptions of capabilities and intentions, not
reality.

62

An interesting observation can be made by comparing the
propaganda and psychological views.

A small change in the

assumed intent renders radically different views of a
proposed action, but both masquerade as deterrence.

The

propaganda view is defensive, warning the U.S. of harsh
penalties should we attack.

The psychological view depicts

deterrence as allowing Soviet action by intimidating the
U.S. out of any counteraction?
served.

an offensive purpose is

In Soviet writings it is often the U.S. that is

depicted as attempting to compel the USSR into a certain
course of action,
aggression.

rather than protecting the U.S. from

It seems that defense

(or deterrence)

is in the

eyes of the beholder.

The propaganda aspect assumes that the primary intended
audience of doctrine is a foreign opponent.

Another view

places doctrine in the field of ideology and thus assumes an
internal audience is targeted.

Undoubtedly ideology plays a

role of some sort as is evidenced by the many works with
titles such as Marxism-Leninism on War and the A r m y .

Many works of doctrine open with the much overquoted
Clausewitz followed by some gem from the venerable V.I.
Lenin.

Because of the very general nature of such opening

statements and the considerable manipulative skill of Soviet
writers the opening lines give no clue as to what might
follow from them (similar to the Malinovskiy speech examined
earlier).

Ideology provides a loose, general framework
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within which many different doctrines could develop.

Some

points of doctrine may be tailored to fulfill ideological
desiderata, but who decides which ones and what the proper
Marxist position should be?

Much discussion in Soviet works and American analysis
of them centers around the nature of modern war and the
possibility of victory in a nuclear war.

Often the Soviet

discussions revolve around Clausewitz as interpreted by
Lenin.

The key issue is how to apply the idea that war is

the continuation of politics by violent means to the nuclear
era.

One view is to contend there has been no change, that
war remains a political tool now, as it always has been.
This view is usually held by those who also believe that
victory is possible in a nuclear war, and that nuclear
weapons are really just better versions of conventional
artillery and aerial bombs.

View number two asserts that

"war can only be the continuation of madness".

This view

asserts that Clausewitz is obsolete in the nuclear age, and
is held by those supporting a deterrent strategy and the
impossibility of victory in a nuclear exchange.

A third

avenue is to attempt a reconciliation of the previous two
views.

Here it is recognized that war is a tool of politics,

but that it has been robbed of its usefulness by nuclear
weapons and no longer represents a sane (possibly beneficial)
policy option.
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As is often the case the supposed subject, Clausewitz,
is not really the heart of the discussion.

His views serve

as a starting point for advocacy of different defense
postures.

According to Raymond Garthoff the "real" question

is what should the state do concerning nuclear war.

Is a

deterrent-only force sufficient or should a war-fighting
capability be pursued?

Differing interpretations of

Clausewitz merely provide a forum for these questions, and
2
are not really concerned with Clausewitz at all.
Another
way in which ideology has been involved is in the SinoSoviet polemics of the I960*s.

The Chinese accused the

Soviets of revisionism and the Soviets, anxious to appear as
the true torch- bearer to other Marxist nations, were careful
not to promote any nuclear war ideas that violated Marxist
. i
3
principles•

While Soviet doctrine naturally has a Marxist flavor,
this by no means determines the final content.

Ideology

could be equally supportive of either a minimum deterrent
strategy or a superiority seeking/ war-fighting strategy, as
is evidenced by the Khrushchev/ Malinovskiy speeches examined
earlier.

Ideology serves as a legitimizing factor and gives

a veneer of continuity to underlying doctrinal changes.

It

seems that no matter what changes are made doctrine remains
faithful to the true Leninist principles.

There is a tension between the ideological and the
propaganda aspects.

Consider the frequently used "positions
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of strength" line as propaganda.

The implication, and

reality at the time it was most heavily used, is that the
Soviet Union was in an inferior position.

While propaganda

addresses itself to minimizing this recognized disadvantage
by denying its usefulness to the U.S., ideology plays up the
superiority of Soviet society as though there was no
disadvantage.

"Firsts" statements are a popular method of

doing this and sometimes stretch the truth a little;
claiming to test the first hydrogen bomb
‘since the U.S.

such as

(technically true

test had been a "device" exploded on the
4

ground, not dropped from a p lane).

Often pieces on doctrine seem to be directed to a
specific internal group rather than a general audience.
Military authors have at least two reasons to direct
statements to top Party officials;

institutional

self-interest and concern for national security.

Stanley

Sienkiewicz points out that "these analytically distinct
motivations are unlikely to be clearly separated in the
military mind."

5

The generals are likely to truly have

national interests at heart but to also believe that what is
good for the armed forces is good for the country.

A more

cynical version of this same view is to assume the desire for
further build-ups is not security related even in the minds
of the brass, but is purely selfish.

Either way the main

point is that doctrine is seen as a tool for advancing
political fortunes rather than adding to the storehouse of
military knowledge.
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Assuming doctrinal writings are targeted to specific
internal groups often leads to the explanation of
contradictions as the result of an internal debate.
participants can be classed in a number of ways.

The

One method

is by stated policy preference and another is by
institutional affiliation.

The policy preference method uses

a classification scheme such as radical/ centrist/
traditional.

This is often difficult since an author often

squeezes several views into one article, making it necessary
to decide which he really means.

Americans who use this

approach often disagree among themselves on how to classify
any given Soviet writer.**

The institutional approach highlights the way in which
actors in the debate support views which benefit their parent
institution.

The results indicate that a large part of the

debate falls along institutional lines.

One objection to

viewing disagreements as a debate over a specific point
as the possibility of victory)

(such

is the extremely long

time-frame over which the same disagreements persist.
Disagreement over the possibility of victory in nuclear war
may still exist.
seem unlikely.

A twenty year debate on this point does
However, if the real point of disagreement is

not the possibility of victory, but the budget priority of
the defense effort, then it is easy to see that it would be a
perennial problem, not subject to a once-and-for-all
solution.
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Whether for self interest or national interest, some
writings are clearly devoted to promoting the armed forces,
or a portion thereof.

A widely known example is Admiral

Gorshkov who has written articles and books promoting the
Navy since the 1960's.

Gorshkov makes a good case for why a

superpower needs a supernavy.

Statements by Gorshkov to the

effect that nuclear submarines are the best platform for
nuclear missiles and should thus recieve the main strategic
missions find scant support in other publications.

His book, The Seapower of the State, provides a good
example of the type of "debate” that occurs in the military
press.

The book unabashedly supports a large navy capable of

performing all naval missions and

explains in detail the many

uses of a navy in peace and war, but he never

denigrates the

other services.

Doctrine is viewed as the "blueprint" of future war
plans by some authors, such as Richard Pipes.

This view

usually considers only military works, dismissing political
statements as unreliable.

Pipes feels that many works

plainly leave the impression that the Soviet Union considers
nuclear war a viable policy option.

Citing Sokolovskiy and

other Soviet authors Pipes concentrates on the traditional
elements of Soviet doctrine which

see nuclear war as

essentially the same as all other wars.

From the Russian historical experience, Pipes draws a
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people willing to use any means of coercion available to
them, and depicts nuclear weapons as just another means of
coercion and violence, to be used as necessary for achieving
goals.

Pipes believes that Soviet doctrine clearly rejects

mutual deterrence altogether.

Intent is the number one issue

with Pipes, and he feels that the Clausewitzian conception of
war rules out a deterrent based strategy.

In closing his

article Pipes says:
Above all, however, looms the question of
intent:
as long as the Soviets persist in
adhering to the Clauswitzian maxim on the
function of war, mutual deterrence does not
really exist.
And unilateral deterrence is
feasible only if we understand the Soviet
war-winning strategy7 and make it impossible
for them to succeed.

Determining intent is indeed the object of many forays
into the forest of doctrine, but as I have suggested here it
can not be determined?

it can only be speculated upon.

Speculation is a more or less endless endeavor, but some
speculations have a much firmer hold on observable reality
than others.
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CONCLUSIONS

My objectives have been to establish that there are
competing ideas on nuclear war in the Soviet Union, suggest
why this is so, and show how these ideas have changed over
time.

Most important is the demonstrated divergence of

military and political figures on nuclear doctrine.

Unless

one accepts the idea that either political or military
statements should not be considered as doctrine it would seem
that Soviet doctrine is rife with disagreement.

There are clearly distinguishable views between the
military and the party leaders.

Both Soviet and American

authors sometimes explain this by differentiating among the
areas of study (doctrine, strategy, military science, etc.)
and how disagreement in some areas is natural.

It can be

useful to separate these areas, but often it merely serves to
confuse the issue and allow two opposing viewpoints to exist
as though they were one.

I have compared statements by

subject matter, not by the category of study they supposedly
fall within.

Attitudes on the possibility of victory in

nuclear war are comparable regardless of where they occur.

My labeling of the main views as "political" and
"military" might suggest a struggle between the party leaders
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and the military establishment.

This study does not deal

directly with the internal politics of the Soviet Union and
does not pretend to define the internal power of the
military.

As stated earlier, I assume the party has full

control of the government, but that within the framework of
government the military does exercise some independence of
thought and action.

The struggle suggested is not over who

slices the economic pie, but how big a slice the military is
to receive.

The question changes from "is there & Soviet

doctrine", to "is Soviet doctrine composed of military
treatises or political tracts."

It should be evident that I have come to the conclusion
that politics seems to be the game more so than soldiering.
This is not surprising in one sense, considering that
doctrine is said to be primarily political by Soviet
definitions.

What the definitions do not account for is that

the military is not just a political tool to be picked up and
discarded at will, but a political actor which interacts with
the other actors.

Doctrine is one means of such interaction.

In review of the two sides of doctrine I think the main
feature of the military view is its adherence to traditional
military thought with its assumption of possible victory,
the need for superiority, and the possibility of defending
one's home territory.

The major change in warfare

attributed to nuclear weapons is the ability to accomplish
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strategic missions directly and immediately.

Large

conventional forces are still seen as necessary, perhaps even
more so since nuclear war would greatly increase casualty
rates•

Considering only military works I think there is little
interest in plotting an aggressive war;

the preference is to

prepare for unspecified future contingencies.

The focus of

the early (1960's) military writings is very heavily weighted
to nuclear weapons.

The only type of war to receive more

than a mention is world nuclear war.

At this time the Soviet

Union was only beginning to build a large nuclear force.

If

war plans were the case I would expect the emphasis to be on
how to employ the weapons available, not on needs for the
future.

What does happen is a shift to more consideration of
conventional war possibilities and new conventional weapons.
This occurs after a large nuclear capability has been
attained.

Again, war plans seems to rank low while general

preparation for an unknown, but possibly hostile,

future

seems likely.

The political view varies more over time than the
military but there are constants below the surface.

In one

way or another the political view always argues that nuclear
weapons have introduced radical changes in military affairs
which render the traditional military view obsolete.

Whereas

73

the military view provides no criteria for optimal force
size, the political view attempts to define and limit what
forces are necessary.

In a sense this corresponds to the Soviet definitions
of doctrine and military science.

Being politically

determined, doctrine must consider economics and political
expediency whereas military science deals only with how to
prepare for and fight wars.

The major trend over time of the political view is
abandoning consideration of victory in nuclear war, and an
ever stronger endorsement of negotiations to control nuclear
weapons.

The pursuit of superiority gives way to proclaiming

parity as the proper relationship between the superpowers.

I

think this view shows a desire to possess military power, but
to do so for a minimal price.

The military view changes the type of war considered
more than anything else.

From initial concentration on full

scale nuclear war there is a move to considering the
possibilities of national liberation wars, and eventually to
war between the superpowers remaining territorily limited or
completely conventional.

The opinion that victory is

possible in nuclear war occurs less and less over the years
and may have now disappeared, but can be found as recently as
1982.1
trends.

Perhaps there is a relationship between these
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One of the early military objections to considering
nuclear war unwinnable was that to do so destroyed the raison
d'etre of the military and undermined morale.

Now that the

unwinnability of nuclear war is widely accepted
military)

(outside the

the military may be reasserting its importance by

concluding that a war need not be nuclear

(remember that the

original formulation by Khrushchev adopted universally until
about 1980 was that war was not inevitable, but should war
occur it would inevitably be a world nuclear w a r ) .

If the

imagined war could remain conventional then all the old rules
about victory and the need for superiority would apply, and
the military would maintain its importance.

Along these lines the recent dismissal of
Chief-of-Staff Ogarkov is very interesting.

On May 9th 1984

he gave an interview to the newspaper Red S t a r , in which he

adopted the view that the certainty of retaliation makes
nuclear war highly unlikely, but also stated that the next
war would probably be fought with high-tech conventional
forces.

He implied that for an effective defense of the

Soviet Union increased attention and funds must be devoted to
new conventional technologies.

On 12 Sept. 1984, Ogarkov was
2
dismissed for "unpartylike tendencies."

If the line of thought presented here is correct,
within the next few years Soviet doctrine will show a greatly
increased interest in conventional war and new conventional
technologies.

The amount of money invested in pursuing such
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programs will indicate to what degree the military has
succeeded in defending its status in Soviet society.
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